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Recent research has shown that information presented by untrustworthy endorsers is likely to 
be thoughtfully elaborated, whereas information presented by trustworthy endorsers is likely to 
be unthinkingly accepted (Priester & Petty, 1995). Study 1 manipulated argument quality and 
assessed cognitive responses to demonstrate that this influence of trustworthiness on persua- 
sion holds for familiar endorsers likely to be used in actual advertisements. Study 2 demon- 
strated that trustworthiness can be influenced by individuals endorsing too many products, with 
similar persuasion consequences (i.e., untrustworthy endorsers prompt greater scrutiny of 
product-related attributes than trustworthy endorsers). Study 2 also found that the attitudes that 
resulted from an untrustworthy endorser came to mind faster, even when those attitudes were 
equivalently positive-thus demonstrating that elaboration can influence attitude accessibility. 
This research provides evidence that attitude extremity may not be a sufficient indicator of ad- 
vertising effectiveness, in that equally extreme attitudes can vary as to the bases by which they 
were formed, their underlying strength, and their effectiveness. Further, this research provides 
theoretical and strategic insight into the use of trustworthy and untrustworthy endorsers. 
The goal of advertising is to present information to potential 
customers. This information, it is hoped, will result in custom- 
ers adopting more favorable attitudes toward the advertised 
product or service. These attitudes, in turn, should result in a 
greater probability of the customer purchasing the advertised 
product or using the service than if the customer had not been 
exposed to the advertisement. 1 A common strategy in advertis- 
ing is to have an endorser present information. But what attrib- 
utes are desirable for an endorser to possess? This question is 
particularly important given research suggesting that the pro- 
cess by which an attitude is formed or changed has crucial im- 
plications for the effectiveness of that attitude to guide future 
behavior, such as purchasing a product (see Petty, Priester, & 
Wegener, 1994; Petty & Wegener, 1997; Priester & Fleming, 
1997; see also Priester, Nayakan Kuppam, Fleming, & Godek, 
in press). The goal of this article is to examine how endorser 
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'Of course, there are times that advertising is intended not to persuade, 
but instead to remind consumers of a product. 
trustworthiness influences message elaboration and advertis- 
ing effectiveness. A trustworthy endorser is one whom people 
perceive to be honest and sincere, whereas an untrustworthy 
endorser is one about whom people feel skepticism and suspi- 
cion (i.e., people question whether one can be trusted to com- 
municate the truth).2 
Contemporary theories in attitudes and persuasion have 
introduced the notion that persuasion can be the result of 
qualitatively different processes. That is, the Elaboration 
21t should be noted that the variable of interest here is trustworthiness, 
not credibility. Since at least 1953, communicator effectiveness has been 
conceptualized within the general construct of credibility. The specific com- 
ponents most often hypothesized to constitute credibility are expertise and 
trusnvorthiness (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Expertise refers to a com- 
municator's ability to confer accurate information (i.e., an expert source pos- 
sesses the requisite knowledge necessary to provide accurate information). 
Trustworthiness refers to a communicator's intent to transmit accurate infor- 
mation (i.e., a trustworthy source is believed to be honest rather than decep- 
tive in communicating information; see Hovland et al., 1953, Chap. 2, for 
further discussion). Our research seeks to examine the implications of en- 
dorser trustworthiness on message processing and persuasion while holding 
endorser expertise constant at a high level. 
Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 
198 1, 1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) contend that attitudes 
can be changed following either a careful and effortful scru- 
tiny of a message (elaboration-based process) or less 
cognitively effortful inference and associative processes. In 
general, research has revealed that persuasion is more likely 
to be the result of thoughtful message elaboration when indi- 
viduals are both motivated and able to consider the informa- 
tion. In contrast, when individuals lack either the motivation 
or ability to consider the merits of the arguments, they rely 
instead on relatively less thoughtful processes (for recent re- 
views, see Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty et al., 1994; 
Petty & Wegener, 1997). 
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND ELABORATION 
Recent research has suggested that endorser trustworthiness 
can influence persuasion by affecting the likelihood that re- 
cipients will engage in message-based elaboration under 
conditions of moderate elaboration likelihood. Specifically, 
Priester and Petty (1995) argued that given a situation in 
which individuals possessed the ability, but lacked the moti- 
vation to elaborate an advertisement, such as when the mes- 
sage is of low personal relevance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) 
or the message recipients do not enjoy thinking (i.e., low in 
need for cognition; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), there would be 
a greater need to think about a message from an expert source 
who was low rather than high in trustworthiness. That is, if a 
message recipient can be confident that an expert source will 
be willing to provide accurate information because of his or 
her high trustworthiness, they may forgo the effortful task of 
scrutinizing the message and, instead, unthinkingly accept 
the conclusion as valid. In contrast, if a message recipient is 
unsure as to whether an expert source will provide accurate 
information because of the source's low or questionable 
trustworthiness, he or she may feel the need to scrutinize the 
arguments to ascertain if the communication is indeed cogent 
and valid. Thus, this perspective suggests that endorsers low 
in trustworthiness can influence attitudes by increasing the 
amount of attention paid to the advertisement. 
This finding is particularly surprising given the wide- 
spread belief that information associated with an untrustwor- 
thy endorser will most likely be unthinkingly rejected, or at 
the very least, severely devalued. And perhaps the most pro- 
vocative implications of the Priester and Petty results arise 
when the conclusions are generalized to the field of advertis- 
ing. The results suggest that advertisers might sometimes be- 
hoove themselves to utilize endorsers of low or questionable 
trustworthiness. Obviously, before such a counterintuitive 
conclusion is advanced, additional research is warranted. 
Perhaps the most important question bears on the 
generalizability of the Priester and Petty results. In all of 
the Priester and Petty experiments, hypothetical sources 
were used for when the message recipients had no informa- 
tion other than that provided in the experiment. In addition, 
the cover story used in these experiments asked the partici- 
pants to form an impression of the speaker. Taken together, 
these two observations provide the basis for an alternative 
explanation to the Priester and Petty results such that mes- 
sage recipients elaborated information from an untrustwor- 
thy more than a trustworthy endorser to come to a more 
confident impression about the unfamiliar source. If such 
an alternative explanation is sound, untrustworthy 
endorsers with whom the audiences are familiar should not 
lead to greater message elaboration than familiar trustwor- 
thy endorsers. And the implication that untrustworthy 
endorsers can sometimes be more effective than trustworthy 
endorsers would not be warranted. Thus, a critical question 
arises as to whether the influence of trustworthiness on 
message elaboration will be observed when the endorsers 
are individuals with whom the audience is familiar before 
the experiment. Experiment 1 was conducted to address this 
question directly by using endorsers with whom the audience 
was familiar. 
INDICATORS OF ELABORATION 
One method commonly used to investigate the impact of 
variables on the extent of elaboration is the measurement of 
cognitive responses (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & 
Brock, 1981; Wright, 1973, 1980). In this approach, both the 
attitude that results from a persuasive communication and the 
thoughts that occurred to a message recipient during expo- 
sure to the persuasive communication are assessed. Differ- 
ences in the extent of message elaboration are inferred by dif- 
ferences in the number of thoughts generated or in the extent 
to which these thoughts predict the resulting attitude.3 In re- 
sponse to criticisms concerning the cognitive response ap- 
proach, a manipulation of argument quality was introduced 
as an alternative means of assessing the extent of message 
scrutiny (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976; see Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986, pp. 30-44; Petty, Wegener, Fabrigar, Priester, & 
Cacioppo, 1993). The logic of manipulating argument qual- 
ity to assess the extent of thinking is that when individuals are 
exposed to a message under specific conditions that foster 
message-based elaboration, the quality of the arguments 
should have a larger impact on attitudes than when elabora- 
tion is low. That is, the greater influence of argument quality 
3~lthough the cognitive response approach is widely used, it is not with- 
out criticism (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, pp. 293-296; Miller & Coleman, 
1981). Much of this criticism focuses on the correlational nature of the ap- 
proach. Specifically, researchers using the cognitive response approach of- 
ten wish to make the inference that, under specific conditions, thoughts are 
the result of effortful elaboration during the message presentation and these 
thoughts are leading to attitudes. However, given the correlational nature of 
this approach, it is alternatively possible that, under specific conditions, the 
reported attitudes are leading to thoughts. 
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on attitudes for one level of a variable than another provides 
an inference of differences in the extent to which individuals 
are basing their attitudes on a thoughtful elaboration of the 
arguments in the advertisement (see Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). 
EXPERIMENT 1 
To examine whether the influence of endorser trustworthi- 
ness on elaboration found in Priester and Petty (1 995) gener- 
alizes to familiar endorsers, an advertisement was con- 
structed that used familiar endorsers of either high of low 
trustworthiness. To examine differences in product-related 
elaboration as a function of endorser trustworthiness, both 
the cognitive response and the manipulation of argument 
quality approaches were used. Both approaches were used to 
(a) provide convergent evidence of differences in product-re- 
lated elaboration as a function of endorser trustworthiness 
and (b) provide mediational evidence of thoughtful versus 
nonthoughtful attitude change. 
Hypotheses 
Thus, the experiment manipulated Argument Quality and 
Endorser Trustworthiness. Our key hypothesis (HI) was that 
an Endorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality interaction 
would emerge on the measure of attitude toward the product. 
This interaction would reveal that argument quality has a 
larger impact on peoples' attitudes when the endorser was 
low rather than high in trustworthiness (Hla). In addition, we 
hypothesized that attitudes resulting from a high and low 
trustworthy endorser would differ in terms of their bases 
(H2). Specifically, the attitudes should be more highly corre- 
lated with the valence of product-relevant cognitive re- 
sponses when the endorser was low rather than high in trust- 
worthiness (H2a). In contrast, we hypothesized that, if 
anything, the attitudes should be more highly correlated with 
the general positive perception of the endorser when the en- 
dorser was high rather than low in trustworthiness (H2b). 
This prediction stems from the hypothesis that individuals 
are more likely to unthinkingly accept the position of a high 
trustworthy source, and would be more accepting of the mes- 
sage the more trustworthy they found the source to be. This 
configuration of attitude and cognitive response results 




A total of 65 undergraduate students at the Ohio State 
University participated. The students were randomly as- 
signed to one of 4 conditions in a 2 x 2 (Endorser Trustwor- 
thiness: High or Low x Argument Quality: Strong or Weak) fac- 
torial experiment. Experimental sessions were conducted in 
groups of 6 to 10. 
All participants received an experimental booklet enti- 
tled "Athletics and Advertising." The first page of the book- 
let explained that there had been a recent trend in advertis- 
ing that integrated athletics with advertising. All 
participants were informed that the booklets contained 
three advertisements that reflected this trend and that they 
should read the three advertisements as if they came across 
them in a magazine. They were further told that their over- 
all reactions to the advertisements would be assessed at the 
end of the booklet. 
One advertisement appeared on each of the second, third, 
and fourth pages of the booklet. All of these ads were pre- 
sented in black and white, with comparable images. The first 
and third advertisements were taken from popular running 
magazines. They were advertisements for a nutritional bar 
and running pants. The second advertisement was the target 
advertisement and is described following. After reading the 
three advertisements, participants were informed that be- 
cause of time constraints, they would only be asked about the 
second of the three advertisements (i.e., the target advertise- 
ment). Participants then answered a series of questions and 
provided their cognitive responses to the advertisement. Af- 
ter all participants in a group had completed the experimental 
booklets, they were debriefed and excused. 
Independent Variables 
Endorser trustworthiness. Endorser trustworthiness 
was manipulated by using either Nancy Kerrigan (high trust- 
worthiness) or Tonya Harding (low trustworthiness) as the 
endorser of a fictitious product-Mercury Roller-Blades.4 
The study was conducted in 1994 at the start of the Winter 
Olympic Games. At the time the experiment was conducted, 
there was a great deal of media attention devoted to the two 
skaters. Although both skaters possessed expertise about the 
product, Nancy Kerrigan was generally viewed as a relatively 
trustworthy person, whereas Tonya Harding was generally 
viewed as a relatively untrustworthy person. Thus, these indi- 
viduals were used to instantiate endorsers of high (Nancy 
Kerrigan) and low (Tonya Harding) trustworthiness. A pic- 
ture of the endorser appeared in the upper left comer of the 
advertisement. To the right of the picture appeared the en- 
dorser's name, under which appeared "U.S. Olympic Repre- 
sentative." 
Argument quality Strong and weak arguments were 
developed and pretested (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) in 
4Roller-blades were chosen as the product because both endorsers, due 
to their expertise in figure skating, could be expected to have relatively high 
and comparable expertise toward the product. The product was also chosen 
because of its interest to the target population in our sample. 
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support of the fictitious product-Mercury Roller- blade^.^ 
Both strong and weak arguments were constructed such that 
they described five attributes of the product. These attributes 
included the fit, cushioning, safety, available colors, and 
price of the roller-blades. The text of the strong and weak ar- 
guments are included in the appendix.6 
Dependent Variables 
Manipulation checks. Participants answered questions 
designed to serve as manipulation checks on the Argument 
Quality and Endorser Trustworthiness manipulations. To as- 
sess perceived argument quality, participants were asked to 
rate how strong the reasons used in the advertisement were on a 
scale ranging from 4 (very weak) and +4 (very strong). To as- 
sess perceived endorser trustworthiness, participants were in- 
structed that "because your impressions of the advertisement 
may have been influenced by your feelings for Nancy Kerrigan 
(or Tonya Harding; whichever endorser they were exposed to), 
we would like you to tell us how you feel about (the endorser) 
by circling whichever number you feel most appropriate on the 
line below." Imbedded within 10 endorser attributes was trust- 
worthiness. Participants provided their rating of trustworthi- 
ness on an 1 1-point scale ranging from I (untrusmorthy) to 1 1 
(trustworthy). 
Attitude measures. On the third page of the question- 
naire, participants were asked to provide responses indicative 
of their attitudes toward the advertised product using a 5-item 
semantic differential. The participants were asked to "rate 
how you feel about the Mercury Roller-Blades by circling a 
number on each of the lines below." Each semantic differen- 
tial was on a 9-point scale ranging from 4 (negative, harm- 
51t is important to reiterate the rationale for the use of the argument qual- 
ity manipulation. In our experiment, half of the participants receive adver- 
tisements specifically designed to elicit unfavorable cognitive responses. 
This manipulation is used as a methodological tool to provide data from 
which to make inferences about the processes underlying attitude change. 
The value of using the manipulation of argument quality is that it allows in- 
sight into how individuals respond to the information provided by endorsers 
of low and high trustworthiness. Obviously, one would never deliberately 
present advertisements comprised of purposefully weak information (i.e., 
weak arguments) in a promotion campaign. Nevertheless, the use of an argu- 
ment quality manipulation in pretesting can provide insight into whether re- 
cipients are paying attention to the substantive information presented or not. 
6As part of a separate experiment conducted to rule out alternative hy- 
potheses, 37 people were asked to rate the arguments. Three separate ques- 
tions were used to indicate the ease or difficulty of understanding the argu- 
ments. These questions were presented on 9-point scales ranging from 4 
(dificult to understand, complex, and dlficulr to think about) to +4 (easy to 
understand, simple, and easy to think about). The alpha coefficient for these 
three items was .97; thus, the three questions were averaged to create one 
measure. An Argument Quality x Endorser Trustworthiness analysis of vari- 
ance revealed no differences in the ease/difficulty of the arguments as a func- 
tion of argument quality, F(1,  33) < .2, p > .6. Thus, any differences in per- 
suasion as a function of Argument Quality could not be explained by 
differences in ease of processing of the strong and weak arguments. 
ful, foolish, bad, and unfavorable) to +4 (positive, benejicial, 
wise, good, and favorable). 
Cognitive responses. After completing the attitude 
measures, individuals were asked to list the thoughts that 
came to mind while reading the message. Participants were 
provided a page containing eight boxes and were instructed 
to write their thoughts in these boxes-one thought per box. 
Participants were further instructed to use only as many 
boxes as the number of thoughts that they could recall (see 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Participants read that they should 
spend at least 3, but no more than 10 min listing their 
thoughts. After listing their thoughts, the participants were 
instructed to code each of the listed thoughts along two di- 
mensions. First, they were asked to identify each thought as 
to its evaluative valence coding each thought as positive, neg- 
ative, or neutrallunrelated to the advertisement. Second, par- 
ticipants were asked to identify each thought as to its subject 
matter. Participants coded each thought as focused on the 
product in the advertisement, the spokesperson associated 
with the topic, or neither. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
The manipulation checks were subjected to 2 x 2 (En- 
dorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality) analysis of vari- 
ance. As expected, participants who read the advertisement 
comprised of strong arguments rated the reasons used in the 
advertisement as stronger (M = 1.1) then those participants 
who read the advertisement comprised of weak arguments 
(M = -.9), F(1, 61) = 28.2, p < .0001. 
Also as predicted, participants perceived Nancy Kerrigan 
to be considerably more trustworthy (M = 7.2) than Tonya 
Harding (M = 3.3), F(1,6 1) = 68.2, p < .0001. Although not 
manipulated, it should be noted that participants were also 
asked to rate the extent to which the endorser was knowl- 
edgeable about roller-blading. On this measure there were no 
statistically significant effects for either Endorser Trustwor- 
thiness or Argument Quality. In summary, the endorser per- 
ception measures found that using the two figure skaters as 
instantiations of two equal experts who differed in trustwor- 
thiness was effective. 
Attitude Measures 
The five semantical differential items were averaged to 
create an attitude index. The standardized alpha coefficient 
for this index was .96. The attitude index was analyzed by a 2 
x 2 (Endorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality) analysis 
of variance. The means and standard deviations for the four 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 1 and graphed 
in Figure 1. 
Of greatest importance, there emerged the predicted En- 
dorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality interaction, F(l ,  
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TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cell Numbers 
for Attitude Index, Experiment 1 
Tonya Harding Nancy Kerrigan 
M SD M SD 
Strong arguments 1.2" 1 .O 1 .2a 0.8 
Weak arguments -1.W 1.8 0 . 9  I .O 
a n =  l k b n =  17. 
Unhuaamrrhy Endorser Tmstwarhy Endoran 
FIGURE 1 Attitude as a function of endorser and argument qual- 
ity: Experiment 1. 
61) = 6.7, p < .02-providing support for hypothesis HI.' 
This interaction revealed that participants who read the ad- 
vertisement endorsed by Tonya Harding were more influ- 
enced by Argument Quality, F ( l , 3  1) = 18.1, p < .0002, than 
were participants who read the advertisement endorsed by 
Nancy Kerrigan, F(l,32) = 4.1, p < .06. That is, the attitudes 
of the participants exposed to the Tonya Harding endorse- 
ment were more influenced by strong (M = 1.2) than weak (M 
= -1 .O) arguments to a greater extent than the participants ex- 
posed to the Nancy Kenigan endorsement (M = 1.2 for strong 
arguments, M = .5 for weak arguments). Thus, the attitude in- 
dexes supported the hypothesis H la  that an endorser of low 
trustworthiness can lead to greater scrutiny of product-re- 
lated information than an endorser of high trustworthiness. 
'Results also revealed significant main effects for both T~stworthiness 
and Argument Quality. First, there was a significant main effect for Endorser 
Trustworthiness, F(1,61) = 6.9, p < .02. Participants had more favorable atti- 
tudes toward the product when it was endorsed by Nancy Kerrigan (M = .8) 
than by Tonya Harding (M = .I). Second, there was a main effect for Argu- 
ment Quality, F(1,61) = 22.2, p c ,0001. Not surprisingly, participants were 
more persuaded by the advertisement containing strong (M = 1.2) rather than 
weak (M = -.2) arguments. 
It is worth commenting on the specific form of the En- 
dorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality interaction. Spe- 
cifically, the attitudes for participants who read a strong argu- 
ment advertisement endorsed by Nancy Kemgan were as 
persuaded as the participants who read an advertisement en- 
dorsed by Tonya Harding. However, it should be recalled that 
the bases of these attitudes were hypothesized to differ. Spe- 
cifically, participants were predicted to have adopted favor- 
able attitudes following the ad by Tonya Harding largely be- 
cause elaboration of the strong arguments resulted in 
favorable reactions to those arguments. However, people 
were relatively favorable toward the product endorsed by 
Nancy Kemgan regardless of argument quality. Because par- 
ticipants exposed to the Nancy Kemgan ad did not base their 
attitudes as much on argument quality, it is most likely that 
the favorable attitudes engendered by the Nancy Kenigan en- 
dorsement were the result of a relatively low-effort process 
such as deciding to like the skates because of the positive im- 
age of Nancy Kenigan rather than because of favorable 
thoughts about the actual merits of the skates. Evidence sup- 
portive of this interpretation is presented next. 
Attitude Predictors 
A product-related cognitive response (PCR) index was cre- 
ated by subtracting the product focused negative from the 
product focused positive cognitive responses. This measure 
thus provided an indication of the overall valence of the 
thoughts generated about the product from the information in 
the advertisement (see Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 1981). If 
participants' attitudes were based more on product-related 
elaboration when the endorser was Tonya Harding than Nancy 
Kemgan, participants' attitudes should be more highly corre- 
lated with their PCRs in the latterthanin theformerconditions. 
To examine this prediction, the PCR index was correlated with 
the postmessage attitude index for each of the  endorser^.^ The 
results of these correlational analyses reveal that for partici- 
pants exposed to the advertisement endorsed by Tonya Har- 
ding, the correlation between the PCR and the attitude index is 
significant (r = .60), whereas for the participants exposed to 
the advertisement endorsed by Nancy Kenigan, this correla- 
tion (r = .25) is not statistically significant. 
For those participants exposed to an ad featuring Nancy 
Kerrigan, attitudes were expected to be based on how posi- 
tively participants perceived the source. To examine this pre- 
8Cognitive response to attitude correlations has been used quite often to 
provide an inference of elaborative processing (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Mackie, 
1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Priester & Petty, 1995). Such an approach 
presumes that the cognitive response profiles (e.g., the positive minus nega- 
tive responses) predict attitudes differentially as a function of elaboration. 
Thus, although individuals may generate equivalent numbers of cognitive 
responses in response to the thought listing task, it is the extent to which 
these cognitive responses influence an individual's attitude that determines 
the extent to which his or her evaluation is based on thoughtful consideration 
versus nonthoughtful acceptance of the advertisement information. 
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diction, attitudes were correlated with the measure of per- 
ceived trustworthiness for each of the endorsers. The results 
revealed that the correlation between perceived endorser 
trustworthiness and the attitude index is significant when the 
endorser is Nancy Kemgan (r = .43), but is not statistically 
significant when the endorser is Tonya Harding (r = .I I). 
To test whether the correlations differed significantly 
from each other, Fisher's r to z transformations were used. In 
support of hypothesis H2a, analyses revealed that attitudes 
were significantly based more on product-focused thoughts 
when the endorser was Tonya Harding than Nancy Kerrigan 
(z = 1 . 8 0 , ~  < .05), and in support of hypothesis H2b, attitudes 
were based marginally more on perceived trustworthiness 
when the endorser was Nancy Kerrigan than Tonya Harding 
(7. = 1.34, p < . I ) .  Thus, the correlations between the attitude 
measure and the attitude predictors were consistent with hy- 
pothesis H2-that the attitudes resulting from a high and low 
trustworthy endorser would differ in terms of their bases. 
Specifically, the advertisement featuring an endorsement by 
a low trustworthy endorser (i.e., Tonya Harding) produced 
attitudes that were based on PCRs to a greater extent than the 
advertisement featuring an endorsement by a high trustwor- 
thy endorser (i.e., Nancy Kerrigan). In addition, the correla- 
tions suggested that the product endorsed by the high trust- 
worthy endorser (i.e., Nancy Kerrigan) produced attitudes 
that were based more on a simple cue inference process (per- 
ception of trustworthiness) than the product endorsed by the 
low trustworthy endorser (i.e., Tonya Harding). 
Clearly, one would never use weak arguments for an ac- 
tual advertisement. Rather, argument quality was manipu- 
lated in this experiment to provide evidence of differences in 
elaboration of product-related information. And the attitude 
mediation results, collapsed across strong and weak argu- 
ments, are consistent with the hypotheses. However, these 
analyses do not specifically address the question of the 
equivalent attitudes formed for each endorser who presented 
strong arguments. Although the attitudes are equivalent as 
assessed by attitude extremity, they are hypothesized to have 
been formed by different psychological processes. 
To examine this question in a more focused manner, the 
correlations between the attitudes and attitude predictors 
were analyzed as a function of endorser for only those par- 
ticipants who received the strong arguments. As predicted, 
these correlational analyses revealed that the general 
mediational pattern held even for those participants ex- 
posed to the strong arguments: For the people exposed to 
the advertisement containing strong arguments endorsed by 
Tonya Harding, the correlation between the PCR and the at- 
titude index is significant (r = .62), whereas for the partici- 
pants exposed to the advertisement containing strong argu- 
ments endorsed by Nancy Kenigan, this correlation (r = 
.08) is not statistically significant. That is, although the atti- 
tudes resulting from both endorsers were equally positive 
(given strong arguments), the attitudes did differ in their 
bases. 
Conclusions 
Recall that Experiment 1 was conducted to examine whether 
the finding that familiar untrustworthy endorsers results in 
greater elaboration than familiar trustworthy endorsers. Both 
the significant Argument Quality x Trustworthiness interac- 
tion on the attitude measure, as well as the attitude predictor 
correlation results, support this generalization. Specifically, 
the results were consistent with the view that (a) endorsers who 
are low in trustworthiness engender greater elaboration of the 
product-related information contained in the advertisement than 
endorsers who are high in trustworthiness and (b) endorsers who 
are high in trustworthiness engender a relatively nonthoughtful 
acceptance4ven when those endorsers are familiar. 
Emerging Questions 
The results of Experiment 1 provide support for the hy- 
pothesis that familiar endorsers low in trustworthiness can 
lead to greater elaboration of product-relevant information 
than endorsers high in trustworthiness. Yet several questions 
emerge from the findings of Experiment 1. 
Elaboration interpretation of the attitude interaction. 
It should be recalled that our conclusions were inferred from 
the predicted Trustworthiness x Argument Quality interac- 
tion and the correlations obtained between the brand atti- 
tudes and the attitude predictors (i.e., PCR index and percep- 
tions of trustworthiness). Specifically, we interpreted the 
nature of the attitude interaction by examining the influence 
of argument quality separately for the high and low trustwor- 
thiness endorsers. This interpretation suggests that argument 
quality influences the attitudes of participants exposed to an 
advertisement endorsed by an untrustworthy more than a 
trustworthy source. 
As noted earlier, inspection of Figure 1 reveals the finding 
that for the strong argument conditions, trustworthy and un- 
trustworthy endorsers resulted in equivalently positive atti- 
tudes. Our explanation of these equivalently extreme attitudes 
is that the psychological processes by which these attitudes 
were formed (i.e., the bases) differ. Similar results have been 
found in research examining the influence of mood on persua- 
sion. For example, in two experiments, Petty, Schumann, 
Richman, and Strathman (1993) found that positive mood led 
to greater attitude change than neutral mood. However, 
mediational analyses revealed that when individuals were mo- 
tivated to think about the merits of the message, mood influ- 
enced the proportion of positive beliefs and beliefs in turn in- 
fluenced attitudes. In contrast, when participants were not 
motivated to think about the merits of the information, mood 
influenced attitudes without influencing beliefs. That is, mood 
influenced attitudes either by a thoughtful or a nonthoughtful 
process. Similarly, we argue that endorser trustworthiness, 
when paired with strong arguments, led to favorable attitudes 
both by a thoughtful and a nonthoughtful process. 
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Alternative interpretation of the attitude interac- 
tion. There exists a different interpretation of the attitude 
interaction. Specifically, one can examine the influence of 
trustworthiness separately for strong and weak arguments. 
Such an examination reveals that Nancy Kerrigan produces 
more favorable attitudes than Tonya Harding in the weak ar- 
gument condition and there is no effect in the strong argu- 
ment condition. One might infer from this interpretation of 
the interaction that the conclusion that an untrustworthy en- 
dorser is superior is not supported.9 It should be noted that 
such an interpretation relies on attitude extremity as the key 
measure of advertising effectiveness. To wit, this interpreta- 
tion argues that because the attitudes resulting from the trust- 
worthy and untrustworthy endorsers are equally positive, 
there is no superiority of the untrustworthy endorser. 
Elaboration and attitude strength. Given these two, 
quite different interpretations of the data, a critical question 
arises as to whether it is possible to demonstrate clearly that the 
attitudes resulting from advertisements associated with un- 
trustworthy endorsers are more effective than the attitudes re- 
sulting from advertisements associated with trustworthy 
endorsers, even when those attitudes are equally positive. Past re- 
search on the influence of elaboration on attitude strength has 
provided evidence that attitudes that are the result of elaboration 
are stronger than attitudes that are based on less thoughtful per- 
suasion processes (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, 
Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995; Petty et al., 1994, forreviews). Forex- 
ample, attitudes based on elaboration have been found to persist 
longer than nonthoughtful attitudes (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Elms, 
1966; Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Verplanken, 1991). Similarly, 
elaborated attitudes have been found to be more resistant to coun- 
ter-persuasion than nonthoughtful attitudes (e.g., Haugtvedt & 
Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). And perhaps most im- 
portant, attitudes that are the result of elaboration have been found 
to be more predictive of behavior than nonthoughtful attitudes 
(e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriquez, 1986; Kallgren & 
Wood, 1986; Leippe & Elkin, 1987; Verplanken, 1991). 
Research has also provided extensive support for the no- 
tion that the speed at which an evaluation comes to mind (i.e., 
the accessibility of an attitude) is an index of the strength of 
that attitude (e.g., Fazio, 1995). And prior work has sug- 
gested a theoretically cogent link between elaboration and 
accessibility. Specifically, Rennier (1988, reported in Petty et 
al., 1995) found that attitudes that were changed as a result of 
relatively thoughtful processes were more accessible-came 
to mind faster-than attitudes that were changed as a result 
of relatively nonthoughtful processes.I0 These various re- 
'Such an interpretation would also need to account for the differences in 
the correlation pattern among the attitudes predictors and the attitude, of 
course. 
"'Interestingly, research also suggests that in addition, attitude accessi- 
bility can influence message elaboration (Fabrigar, Priester, Petty, & 
Wegener 1998). 
search findings suggest that a theoretically meaningful indi- 
cator of attitude strength is the speed with which an attitude 
comes to mind. 
Tests of competing interpretations. Although Ex- 
periment 1 provided evidence in support of the prediction 
that endorsers low rather than high in trustworthiness can 
lead to greater elaboration of product-related information, it 
did not provide direct evidence that the attitudes resulting 
from an untrustworthy endorser are stronger than the atti- 
tudes resulting from a trustworthy endorser. Such a finding 
would provide compelling support for the elaboration, over 
the alternative, attitude interaction interpretation. In addi- 
tion, such a finding would constitute a contribution above 
and beyond the findings of Petty et al. (1993). Recall that 
Petty et al. (1993) provided evidence that equivalently ex- 
treme attitudes could be the result of different psychologi- 
cal processes. However, this evidence was in the form of at- 
titude to cognitive response correlations and did not provide 
evidence of the differential effectiveness of the attitudes. 
Differences in attitude accessibility would provide such 
unique evidence. In fact, although the Rennier (1988) find- 
ing is widely reported, the finding that elaboration leads to 
greater accessibility would represent the first published re- 
porting of this relation. 
Manipulation of trustworthiness. It is clear that the 
instantiations of trustworthiness used in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
Tonya Harding and Nancy Kenigan) are associated with at- 
tributes other than trustworthiness upon which these individ- 
uals also differed. That is, these individuals were chosen to 
manipulate high and low trustworthiness specifically be- 
cause both represented endorsers with whom the recipients 
were familiar and reflect the use of this manipulation as it 
might have occurred in natural contexts. However, familiar- 
ity influences not only perceptions of trustworthiness, as in- 
tended, but other attributes, as well. For example, Tonya Har- 
ding and Nancy Kerrigan most likely differed in terms of 
likability, attractiveness, and even expectation of winning a 
medal at the Olympics. In fact, it may often be the case that 
naturally occurring trustworthiness will be associated with 
other factors, such as likability. Although unlikely, it is possi- 
ble that one or even several of these other attributes could be 
responsible for the results observed in Experiment 1. 
Bases of trustworthiness. It can also be argued that 
individuals perceived Tonya Harding to be untrustworthy 
for unusual reasons that are not relevant to typical advertis- 
ing situations. Tonya Harding was the recipient of extensive 
television and newspaper coverage suggesting that she was 
involved in an illegal attempt to maim her rival competitor. 
In contrast, trustworthiness for actual endorsers is more 
likely to be influenced by less sensational events. For ex- 
ample, advertising recipients might believe that a celebrity 
who endorsers many products cannot be believed because 
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that celebrity will endorser any product, regardless of the 
product's merit." Although both Tonya and an over-en- 
dorsed celebrity may be perceived as untrustworthy, the ba- 
sis of the trustworthiness may differ significantly. Tonya is 
perceived to be untrustworthy because of sensational events 
that are newsworthy, whereas an over-endorsed celebrity is 
perceived untrustworthy because of having endorsed too 
many products. If it is the sensational basis of Tonya's 
untrustworthiness that is responsible for the persuasion re- 
sults of Experiment 1, than the implications for advertising 
are much more limited than if it is the untrustworthiness per 
se that is responsible for the persuasion results. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
We conducted Experiment 2 to replicate Experiment 1, 
while at the same time addressing the concerns that 
emerged from Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we manipu- 
lated the information provided on unfamiliar endorsers to 
assure that these endorsers differed only on trustworthi- 
ness. In addition, the basis of their trustworthiness was 
manipulated to suggest that they were trustworthy or not 
as a result of over-endorsement. By manipulating trust- 
worthiness in this manner, we addressed the concerns (a) 
that attributes other than trustworthiness were responsible 
for the results of Experiment 1 and (b) that the results of 
trustworthiness on persuasion found in Experiment 1 
would generalize to trustworthiness as a function of 
over-endorsement. In addition, Experiment 2 assessed an 
indicator of the strength of the attitudes resulting from the 
trustworthy and untrustworthy endorsers-the accessibil- 
ity of the attitude toward the endorsed brand. By assessing 
this indicator of attitude strength, we directly addressed 
the cogency of the two, quite different interpretations of 
the attitude interaction. 
Hypotheses . . 
As in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 manipulated Argument 
Quality and Endorser Trustworthiness. And as in Experi- 
ment 1, we hypothesized that an Endorser Trustworthiness 
x Argument Quality interaction would emerge on the mea- 
sure of attitudes toward the product (H3), such that argu- 
ment quality has a larger impact on peoples' attitudes when 
the endorser was low rather than high in trustworthiness 
(H3a). In addition, we hypothesized that attitudes resulting 
from a high and low trustworthy endorser would differ in 
terms of their bases (H4). Specifically, we hypothesized 
the perception of trustworthiness, when the endorser was 
high rather than low in trustworthiness (H4a).l2 We hypoth- 
esized, also, that the attitudes formed as a result of the un- 
trustworthy endorser would be more accessible (i.e., come 
to mind faster) than the attitudes formed as a result of the 
trustworthy endorser (H5). This configuration of results 
would provide strong support for the finding that untrust- 
worthy endorsers engender not only greater elaboration 
than trustworthy endorsers, but also lead to stronger and 
more effective attitudes (i.e., the elaboration interpretation). 
Methods 
Procedure 
A total of 106 undergraduate students at the University of 
Michigan participated. The students were randomly assigned 
to one of four experimental conditions in a 2 x 2 (Endorser 
Trustworthiness; High or Low x 2 Argument Quality; Strong 
or Weak) factorial experiment. Experimental sessions were 
conducted in groups of 8 to 20. 
All participants received an experimental booklet in 
which the first page provided instructions. These instructions 
explained that they would read and evaluate three mock-ups 
of print advertisements. The instructions also explained that 
because these advertisements were still in development, for 
each advertisement they would read two sections-one sec- 
tion in which the spokesperson is described and a second sec- 
tion in which the wording for the advertisement is described. 
Participants were instructed to read the advertisements as if 
they came across them in a magazine and that they could 
spend as little or as much time reading each advertisement as 
they wished. 
One advertisement was described on each of the second, 
third, and fourth pages of the booklet. For each advertise- 
ment, there was a section entitled "spokesperson" at the top 
half of the page and a section entitled "what the advertise- 
ment will say" at the bottom half of the page. The first ad 
was for a nutritional bar; the second ad was for a sports 
drink; and the third ad was the target, for Mercury l n ~ i n e  
Skates.13 Immediately after reading the three advertise- 
ments, participants answered a series of questions on all 
three of the advertisements. At this time, participants pro- 
vided their attitudes toward the product and their impres- 
sions of the endorser. 
Participants then completed unrelated experimental mate- 
rial for approximately 30 min. Following this unrelated mate- 
rial, all participants completed a computer task in which they 
responded to three attitude measures toward 20 different ob- 
that the attitudes should be more highly correlated with the 
general positive perception of the endorser, as indicated by '*Cognitive responses and an argument quality manipulation check were 
not assessed in Experiment 2 in that both had been collected and shown to be 
reliable in Experiment 1. 
"Such a belief has been used to explain why popular actors in the United '"he target advertisement was moved from the second to third adver- 
States widely advertise in foreign markets, at the same time that they only se- tisement position as a minor modification to assure that the results of Experi- 
lectively advertise in their home market. ment 1 were not limited to specific advertising positioning. 
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jects, including the target product (Mercury InLine Skates).'4 
This task assessed the accessibility of their attitude toward 
the product. 
Independent Variables 
Endorser trustworthiness. Endorser trustworthiness 
was manipulated by the information provided on the spokes- 
person. In all conditions, the spokesperson (Chad "Skates" 
McNamara) was described as likeable and expert.15 Spe- 
cifically, all participants read that: 
A picture of Chad "Skates" McNamara doing a complicated 
InLine move with apparent ease dominates the ad. Chad is 
shown smiling and enjoying the Mercury InLine Skates. 
Chad is familiar to many InLine Skaters. He is considered the 
most likeable and friendly of all current top InLine Skaters. 
He is known as well for his laid back, friendly approach to 
life as he is for his moves on skates. He is considered to be 
one of the top InLine Skaters in the world, having won nu- 
merous free-style competitions in both national and interna- 
tional competition. 
For participants assigned to the high trustworthiness condi- 
tions, Chad was additionally described as trustworthy. Spe- 
cifically, the aforementioned information continued with: 
One of the industry leaders said after learning that Chad 
would promote the Mercury InLine Skates, "there is no doubt 
that Chad knows InLine Skates, and InLiners will most defi- 
nitely trust whatever he says, since he only puts his name on 
products that he believes in." Chad is without a doubt a top 
expert who truly knows InLine Skates. And the audience will 
be confident that he is telling them accurate information, be- 
cause he is considered as trustworthy as he is expert and 
friendly. "That's Chad," said the industry leader, "friendly, 
expert, and trustworthy.'' 
For participants assigned to the low trustworthiness condi- 
tions, Chad was additionally described as untrustworthy. 
Specifically, the aforementioned information continued 
with: 
One of the industry leaders said after learning that Chad 
would promote the Mercury InLine Skates, "there is no doubt 
that Chad knows InLine Skates, but InLiners may not trust 
I4A 30-min interval was introduced before assessing attitude accessibil- 
ity to provide a strong test of the predicted influence of elaboration on acces- 
sibility. A finding that elaboration resulted in differences in accessibility af- 
ter 30 min filled with distracting material provides an even stronger case for 
the superiority of thoughtfully formed attitudes over nonthoughtfully 
formed attitudes. 
15Recall that one of the purposes of Experiment 2 was to control for fac- 
tors that may covary with naturally occuning trustworthiness, such as 
likeability. Thus, the fictitious endorser was described as likeable in both the 
trustworthy and untrustworthy conditions to isolate the influence of trust- 
worthiness from these other possible factors. 
whatever he says, since he puts his name on so many prod- 
ucts, whether he believes in them or not." Chad is without a 
doubt a top expert who truly knows InLine Skates. But the 
audience may not be confident that he is telling them accu- 
rate information, because he is considered as untrustworthy 
as he is expert and friendly. "That's Chad," said the industry 
leader, "friendly, expert, and untrustworthy." 
Argument quality The strong and weak arguments 
used in Experiment 1 were modified to be gender appropriate 
(e.g., extremely large, rather than tiny, feet). Under the "what 
the advertisement will say" section, these arguments were 
presented, following a brief introduction paragraph and be- 
fore a concluding line. 
Dependent Variables 
Following the three advertisements in the booklet were 
measures designed to assess attitudes and spokesperson per- 
ceptions. Participants completed three pages of mea- 
sures--one page for each advertisement. On each page, the 
participants completed five items designed to measure atti- 
tude toward the advertised product and five items designed to 
measure perceptions of the spokesperson. Approximately 30 
min after completing these measures, participants performed 
a computer task in which the response latency toward a vari- 
ety of attitude objects was assessed.'6 
Manipulation check. Participants answered questions 
designed to serve as a manipulation check on the Endorser 
Trustworthiness manipulation. To assess perceived endorser 
trustworthiness, participants were instructed to "indicate your 
feelings about the spokesperson on the lines below." Imbedded 
within five endorser attributes was trustworthiness. Partici- 
pants provided their rating of trustworthiness on an 9-point 
scale ranging from 4 (untrustworthy) to +4 (trustworthy). 
Attitude measures. Participants answered five ques- 
tions designed to assess their attitude toward the product. 
These questions were on 9-point scales ranging from 4 
(negative, harmjid, foolish, unfavorable, and bad) to +4 (pos- 
itive, beneficial, wise, favorable, and good). 
Attitude accessibility Participants were given instruc- 
tions that they would be presented with a series of questions 
on the computer screen and that they would respond by press- 
ing one of two computer keys. Additionally, participants 
were instructed to respond both as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. Following these instructions, participants com- 
pleted the response-time task, which consisted of 60 trials. 
The first 20 trials asked participants to respond to whether 20 
attitude objects were good or bad. The second 20 trials asked 
participants to respond to whether the same 20 attitude ob- 
I6Dependent measures unrelated to the hypotheses of interest are not dis- 
cussed further. 
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jects were positive or negative, and the third 20 trials asked 
participants to respond to whether the attitude objects were 
favorable or unfavorable. The attitude objects included three 
automobiles (in Positions 1 through 3), the three sports-re- 
lated products to which the participants were exposed (in Po- 
sitions 4 through 6), and 14 unrelated consumer products (in 
Positions 7 through 20). Latency of the time between presen- 
tation of the attitude object and response to the attitudinal 
question was recorded by the computer.17 
Results 
Trustworthiness Check 
The manipulation check for trustworthiness was sub- 
jected to a 2 2 (Endorser Trustworthiness x Argument Qual- 
ity) analysis of variance. Not surprisingly, the endorser de- 
scribed as untrustworthy was perceived to be less trustworthy 
(M = -1.4) than the endorser described as trustworthy (M = 
2.4), F(1, 102) = 112, p < .0001.18 
Attitude Measures 
The five semantical differential items were averaged to 
create an attitude index. The standardized alpha coefficient 
for this index was .92. The attitude index was analyzed by a 2 
x 2 (Endorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality) analysis 
of variance. The means and standard deviations for the four 
experimental conditions are presented in Table 2 and graphed 
in Figure 2. 
Of greatest importance, there emerged the predicted En- 
dorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality interaction, F(1, 
102) = 4.3, p < .05-replicating the results of Experiment 1 
and providing support for hypothesis H3.I9 This interaction 
revealed that participants who read the advertisement en- 
dorsed by the untrustworthy endorser were more influenced 
by Argument Quality, F(1, 47) = 34.4, p < .0001, than were 
"These instructions are based on Fazio (1990). 
IsIn addition to this main effect for Endorser Trustworthiness, there was 
also a main effect for Argument Quality, revealing that endorsers who used 
strong arguments were perceived to be more trustworthy (M = I. I) than 
endorsers who used weak arguments (M = .I), F(3, 102) = 10.9, p < .01. 
These two main effects were qualified by a significant Endorser T N S ~ W O ~ -  
thiness x Argument Quality interaction, F(I, 100) = 6.6, p < .02. This inter- 
action revealed that the influence of Argument Quality on perception of 
Trustworthiness was greater when the endorser was untrustworthy (MSmng = 
-.4, Mwerrk = -2.2), F(1, 47) = 11.8, p < .002 than when the endorser was 
trustworthy (M,,: = 2.4, Mwerrk = 2.3), F(l ,53) < I ,  p > .6. 
19As in Experiment 1, analyses also revealed significant main effects for 
both Trustworthiness and Argument Quality. First, there was a significant 
main effect for Endorser Trustworthiness, F(1, 102) = 7.4, p < .01. Partici- 
pants had more favorable attitudes toward the product when it was endorsed 
by the trustworthy spokesperson (M = 1.2) than when it was endorsed by the 
untrustworthy spokesperson (M = .4). Second, there was a main effect for 
Argument Quality, F(1, 102) = 2 7 . 7 , ~  < ,0001. Not surprisingly, participants 
were more persuaded by the advertisement containing strong (M = 1.6) 
rather than weak (M = .4) arguments. 
TABLE 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cell Numbers 




M SD M SD 
Strong arguments 1.5a 0.8 1.7b 1.4 
Weak arguments -0.9C 1.9 0.7* 2.0 
participants who read the advertisement endorsed by the 
trustworthy endorser, F(1, 53) = 3.8, p = .06. Thus, the atti- 
tude indexes replicated the results of Experiment 1 and sup- 
ported hypothesis H3a-that an endorser of low trustworthi- 
ness can lead to greater scrutiny of product-related 
information than an endorser of high trustworthiness. 
Attitude Predictors 
As in Experiment 1, the attitudes for participants who read 
an advertisement comprised of strong arguments endorsed 
by the trustworthy spokesperson were as persuaded as the 
participants who read an advertisement endorsed by the un- 
trustworthy spokesperson. However, the bases of these atti- 
tudes were predicted to differ. Specifically, Hypothesis H4a 
predicted that the attitudes should be more highly correlated 
with the general positive perception of the endorser, as indi- 
cated by the perception of trustworthiness, when the endorser 
was high rather than low in trustworthiness. To examine this 
prediction, attitudes were correlated with the measure of per- 
ceived trustworthiness for each of the endorsers. The results 
revealed that the correlation between perceived endorser 
Untrustworthy Endorser Tmstworthy Endorser 
FIGURE 2 Attitude as a function of endorser trustworthiness and 
argument quality: Experiment 2. 
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trustworthiness and the attitude index is r = .67 when the en- 
dorser is trustworthy and is r = .46 when the endorser is un- 
trustworthy. To test whether the correlations differed signifi- 
cantly from each other, Fisher's r to z transformations were 
used. In support of Hypothesis H4a, attitudes were based 
marginally more on perceived trustworthiness when the en- 
dorser was trustworthy rather than untrustworthy, z = 1.6, p = 
.06. This relation emerged even stronger when only the atti- 
tudes resulting from the strong arguments were considered, z 
= 2.0, p < .03. Specifically, the correlation between percep- 
tion of endorser trustworthiness and attitude for the trustwor- 
thy endorser paired with strong arguments was r = .60 0, < 
.001), whereas the correlation for the untrustworthy endorser 
paired with strong arguments was r = .04 (p > 2) .  
Attitude Accessibility 
To test the critical hypothesis that the attitudes based on ad- 
vertisements endorsed by the untrustworthy spokesperson 
would be more accessible than the attitudes based on adver- 
tisements endorsed by the trustworthy spokesperson (H5), the 
response latency data were analyzed in a manner recom- 
mended by Fazio (e.g., Fazio, Hen; & Olney, 1984). Spe- 
cifically, the response latency times were subjected to a recip- 
rocal transformation and all data analyses were performed on 
these transformed scores. Mean latencies were calculated for 
the target attitude object (Mercury InLine Skates) by averag- 
ing the transformed latencies across the three different attitude 
measures. In addition, the mean latencies were calculated for 
the attitude object that immediately preceded the target atti- 
tude for each of the three trials. An analysis of variance re- 
vealed that response latencies to this nontarget attitude object 
did not vary as a function of Endorser Trustworthiness or Atti- 
tude Strength. Thus, the response latencies to this nontarget at- 
titude object were used to control for individual differences in 
the latency of response to any attitudinal inquiry. Specifically, 
a response latency index was calculated by subtracting the tar- 
get attitude response latencies from the nontarget attitude re- 
sponse latencies. This response latency index was subjected to 
a 2 x (Endorser Trustworthiness x Argument Quality) analysis 
of variance. This analysis revealed only a significant main ef- 
fect for Endorser Trustworthiness, F( l ,  98) = 4 . 6 , ~  < .05.20 In 
support of Hypothesis H5, participants who had read the ad- 
vertisement endorsed by the untrustworthy spokesperson re- 
spondedfasterto the attitude questions than participants who ( 
Conclusions 
Recall that we conducted Experiment 2 to address concerns 
that arose from Experiment 1 .  One concern had to do with the 
interpretation of the attitude interaction from Experiment 1. 
Given that there was no difference for trustworthiness for 
20Because of computer difficulties, data for only 102 participants could 
be used in this analysis. 
strong arguments, one could conclude that the untrustworthy 
endorser is not superior. In Experiment 2, a measure of atti- 
tude strength was collected. And this measure revealed that, 
even for the equivalently extreme attitudes associated with 
strong arguments, the attitudes formed from the advertise- 
ment endorsed by an untrustworthy endorser came to mind 
faster than the attitudes formed from the advertisement en- 
dorsed by the trustworthy endorser. Recall also that the atti- 
tude accessibility measure was collected 30 min after partici- 
pants were exposed to the advertisements. Such a finding 
provides support for the elaboration interpretation of the atti- 
tude interaction. 
Recall too that Experiment 1 used familiar endorsers. It is 
possible that the differences in product elaboration uncov- 
ered in Experiment 1 may have been the result of attributes 
upon which the endorsers differed other than trustworthiness. 
Experiment 2, in contrast, used endorsers with whom the par- 
ticipants were not familiar. Instead, the trustworthiness of the 
endorser was manipulated. And the results of Experiment 2 
fully replicated the results of Experiment 1. These findings 
suggest that trustworthiness can influence persuasion both 
when trustworthiness is associated with other factors (Exper- 
iment 1) and when trustworthiness is manipulated to be inde- 
pendent of these other factors. Finally, trustworthiness in Ex- 
periment 2 was manipulated by stating that an individual 
either endorsed too many products to be trusted or endorsed 
only products of merit. The results of Experiment 1 were rep- 




Multiple influences of trustworthiness 
This research is noteworthy in that it provides evidence 
for two distinct processes by which source trustworthiness 
can influence attitudes. First, source trustworthiness influ- 
enced the extent of elaboration. When source trustworthi- 
ness was low, recipients engaged in greater product-related 
elaboration than when source trustworthiness was high. Un- 
der low-source trustworthiness, argument quality had a 
larger impact on attitudes and product focused thoughts 
were more highly correlated with attitudes than when 
source trustworthiness was high. Second, source trustwor- 
thiness served as a simple cue when perceptions of high 
trustworthiness reduced message elaboration. That is, when 
the endorser was perceived as trustworthy, not only did this 
attenuate the impact of argument quality and mes- 
sage-based thinking, but attitudes tended to be influenced 
211t is interesting to speculate whether the influence of endorser trust- 
worthiness on persuasion generalizes to the trust with which individuals feel 
for companies. Future research should address this important question. 
by how trustworthy recipients perceived the source to be.22 
Understanding when and how variables influence attitudes 
increases our understanding of the processes by which atti- 
tudes are changed-and the strength (effectiveness) of the 
resulting attitudes. 
Elaboration likelihood 
It is important to state explicitly the conditions under 
which the present experiments were run. The experiments 
were designed such that participants possessed the ability 
(i.e., they were not distracted nor were the ads presented in a 
capacity-straining manner) but did not necessarily possess 
the motivation to elaborate the ads. That is, the likelihood 
that participants would elaborate the information in the ads 
was not constrained to be either very high or low. Participants 
could choose to elaborate the ads or not, according to their 
motivation. As such, these experiments were conducted un- 
der moderate elaboration likelihood. Importantly, these are 
likely to be the precise conditions under which many recipi- 
ents encounter advertisements. Had the elaboration likeli- 
hood level of this experiment been manipulated to be quite 
high, it is most likely that all participants would have been in- 
fluenced by their thoughts in response to the advertisements 
(i.e., the argument quality manipulation) and the manipula- 
tion of endorser trustworthiness would not have had much in- 
fluence on message elaboration, or would have influenced 
the nature of the elaborated thoughts. Similarly, had the elab- 
oration likelihood been manipulated to be very low such as 
by distracting participants from elaborating (e.g., providing 
audiences with a television ad presented at a very rapid pace 
so that message processing was quite difficult; Moore, 
Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986; Smith & Shaffer, 1995), 
it is most likely that the endorser trustworthiness manipula- 
tion would have served as a nonthoughtful message accep- 
tance cue and there would have been little influence of the 
thoughts in response to the information (i.e., argument qual- 
ity). Thus, under conditions of low elaboration likelihood, it 
under certain conditions, the use of an expert endorser about 
whom recipients have some suspicion may be advantageous, 
and to suggest that under certain conditions the use of a trust- 
worthy source may be disadvantageous. In short, our experi- 
ment provides evidence that untrustworthy endorsers can 
lead to more elaborated attitudes and that trustworthy 
endorsers can lead to more nonthoughtful attitudes. This un- 
derstanding of how endorser trustworthiness influences per- 
suasion is particularly important given the relation between 
elaboration and attitude strength. 
When to use untrustworthy endorsers 
Our research suggests that untrustworthy (but expert) 
endorsers will be especially effective when two conditions 
are met. First and foremost, untrustworthy endorsers will be 
effective when presenting information that elicits positive 
PCRs when thoughtfully considered by the target of the ad- 
vertisement. The advantage of using an endorser who is of 
questionable trustworthiness is that such an endorser will 
prompt increased elaboration of the information. Such in- 
creased elaboration will only be advantageous if the 
thoughts that arise in response to the information are posi- 
tive (see Haugtvedt & Priester, 1997). Under such condi- 
tions, the valence of the attitudes resulting from an untrust- 
worthy endorser will be as, if not more, positive than the 
attitudes resulting from the use of a trustworthy endorser. 
Second, untrustworthy endorsers will be especially effec- 
tive when the information is presented under conditions of 
moderate elaboration likelihood-when individuals have 
the requisite ability but lack the explicit motivation to elab- 
orate the information conveyed in an advertisement. It is 
exactly under such conditions that the use of an untrustwor- 
thy endorser can increase the amount of thought that indi- 
viduals expend on the product-related information. And it 
is this increase in elaboration that provides benefits that in- 
fluence advertising effectiveness. 
is predicted that information provided by an untrustworthy 
endorser would be unthinkingly rejected. Why to use untrustworthy endorsers 
Convergent evidence was provided in both studies that, al- 
Strategic Insights though the attitudes resulting from the strong arguments 
Clearly, the question of when and why to use endorsers of 
high and low trustworthiness is a complicated issue that re- 
quires consideration of several factors. The point of this re- 
search is not to advocate for the use of untrustworthy 
endorsers. Rather, the point of this research is to suggest that 
were equally positive for both endorsers, the amount of 
thought upon which the attitudes were based differed signifi- 
cantly. And these differences in product-related thought are 
associated with important differences in attitude strength, as 
demonstrated by the differences in attitude accessibility re- 
vealed in Experiment 2. Given that the goal of advertising is 
to influence a consumer's behavior over a long period of time 
22This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the multiple and in the face of counter-persuasion attempts by other ad- 
roles by which variables can influence attitudes advanced by the Elaboration vertisements, it is sensible for marketers to be interested in 
Likelihood Model (ELM). Specifically, the ELM predicts that variables establishing thoughtful (i.e., elaborated) attitudes toward the 
(such as trustworthiness) can influence attitudes by (a) simple cue effects, 
(b) increasing or decreasing elaboration, (c) serving as arguments as to the product that are persist, and guide behavior' 
central merits of an attitude, and (d) influencing the valence of cognitive re- And the use of an untrustworthy endorser might be a useful 
sponses (i.e., biasing elaboration). strategic tool in accomplishing this very goal. 
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APPENDIX 
Strong Argument 
The most important reason to choose MERCURY ROL- 
LER-BLADES is their fit: MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES 
are designed to fit any foot, no matter what size. They come 
in sizes 4 to 14, with widths for extremely thin to extremely 
wide feet. And the specially designed cushioning makes it 
feel as if you are riding on air. Your feet feel free, which pre- 
vents them from tiring, and helps stabilize them. In addition 
to comfort, the MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES are de- 
signed with safety in mind. The excellent fit makes the 
MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES easier to control, which 
adds excitement. And control translates to fewer injuries. 
Consumer reports rated the MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES 
number one in safety for all roller-blades manufactured in 
1993! And, the MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES come in ev- 
ery color from neon-yellow to midnight-blue, with 12 excit- 
ing colors in between. And if that's not enough, MERCURY 
ROLLER-BLADES are affordable. Check your local sports 
dealer and you will find that the MERCURY ROL- 
LER-BLADES are, on average, 15% to 20% less expensive 
than other roller-blades. 
Weak Argument 
The most important reason to choose MERCURY ROL- 
LER-BLADES is their fit: MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES 
are designed for very small and hard to fit feet, like mine. 
They come in sizes 4 to 6, with widths for extremely thin feet. 
And the specially designed cushioning makes it feel as if you 
are riding on a fairly smooth concrete surface. Your feet feel 
heavy, which can make them tire quickly, but also stabilizes 
them. In addition to comfort, the MERCURY ROL- 
LER-BLADES are designed with safety in mind. The ex- 
tremely tight fit makes the MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES 
harder to control, which adds excitement. And control trans- 
lates to fewer injuries. Consumer reports rated the MER- 
CURY ROLLER-BLADES number six in safety for all 
roller-blades manufactured in 1993! And, the MERCURY 
ROLLER-BLADES come in every color from black to 
white, with 12 shades of grey in between. And if that's not 
enough, MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES are affordable. 
Check your local sports dealer and you will find that the 
MERCURY ROLLER-BLADES are, on average, only 15% 
to 20% more expensive than other roller-blades. 
